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[S.F. No. 21503. In Bank. Dec. 12, 1963.]

RAYMOND LEROY KOPF, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v. H. O. :MILAM et al., Cross-defendants and Respondents.
r1]

.•~

Appeal-Record-Judgment Roll-Matters Reviewable.'Where un appeal on the clerk's tran~cript and certain exhibits is treated as an appeal on the judglllent roll, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings is not open to
question.
f2] Brokers-Licenses-Partnership.-A real estate brokerage
partnership must be licensed and may becolllc so l'ither by securing a partnership license or by securing licl'l\ses for all of
its individual partners; the Real E~tate Law (Bus & Prof.
Code, §§ 10000-10221) does not prohibit iudi l"idunlly licensed
real e"tate brokers from acting in partnership without a separate license.
[3] Id.-Actions for Compensation-Presumptions-Acceptability
of Purchaser.-\Vhen a vendor enters a valid unconditional
contract of sale of realty with a purcha~er procured by a
broker, the purchaser's acceptahility is concluiiively pre~ullled
because the vendor is estopped to deny the qualifications of a

r2] Sl'e Cal.Jur.2d, Brokers, § 8; Am.Jur., Brokers (1st ed § 8).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § ;j14(;j); [2]
Brokers, § 5; [3] Brokers, § 142; [4] Brokers, § 101; [5] Brokers,
§ 53.
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purchaser with whom he is willing to contract.
[4] Id.-Compensation-As Dependent on Consummation of Transaction.-When a contract for the sale of real property is conditional, the broker's commission is not earned if the condition
is not performed.
[5] Id.-Compensation-As Dependent on Contract of Employment
-Construction of Contract.-_-\. clause in a contract for the
sale of real property making the contract "subject to Buyers
assuming an existing loan" was a condition, not a promise,
which had to be fulfilled before the real estate broker would
be entitled to his commission where the note evidencing the
loan provided that if any change were made in the title to the
property, the holder of the note could forthwith declare the
entire principal amount of over $50,000 due and payable; in
view of this drastic consequence to both parties and the conditional language used by them, it was reasonable to conClude,'
that they intended to make the sale contingent on the purchasers' obtaining the approval of the holder of the note
before any change in title to the property.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Marin County. N. Charles Brusatori, Judge. Affirmed.
Cross-action to recover a real estate commission.
ment for cross-defendants affirmed.

,

Judg-;

Howard B. Crittenden, Jr., for Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Elliot W. Seymour for Cross-defendants and Respondents.
TRA YNOR, J.-In this action for a real estate commis~
sion, cross-complainant, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff,
appeals from a judgment for cross-defendants, hereinafter
referrcd to as defendants. [1] Thc appeal on the clerk's
transcript and certain exhibits is treated as an appeal on the
judgment roll (White v. Jones, 136 Cal.App.2d 567, 569 [288
P.2d 913]), and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings is thercfore not open to question.
Plaintiff sought to recover his commission on the ground
that he had secured a purchaser after defC'ndants listed their
property with him doing business as 'Vm. E. Doud & Co. The
trial court found that "\Vm. E. Doud & Co. was a copartnership consisting of plaintiff and one Hoffman. Although both
plaintiff and Hoffman were licensed real estate brokers, the
trial court found that they had not secured a separate partnership liccnse pursuant to the Real Estate Law. (Bus. &

)
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Prof. Code, §§ 10000-10221.) It also made findings against
plaintiff on the merits.
Section 10130 1 of the Business and Professions Code prohibits any person from acting as a real estate broker without
a license. Section 10136 2 provides that no pcrson may bring
or maintain an action for a broker's commission without establishing that he was licensed when the cause of action
arose. Section 100063 provides that "person" includes a copartnership.
[2] Defendants contend that since a copartnership is a
person and since aU persons must be licensed to act as brokers, the partnership must be licensed as sneh to permit tht'
partners to act as brokers on its behalf. Plaintiff concedes
that a partnership must be licensed, but contends that it may
become licensed either by securing a partnership license or by
securing licenses for all of its partners. We agree with plaintiff's contention.
When each member of a real estate brokerage partnership
is a licensed broker no purpose would be served by requiring
an additional license. Thus, whether an applicant for a real
estate broker's license is an individual or a partnership, the
issuance of a license depends on whether the applicant has
the following three qualifications: good character and reputation in the community,4 specified experience as a real estate
salesman or education equivalent thereto,5 and the basic
skills necessary to the transaction of a brokerage business. 6
When each member of a partnership is licensed as a broker,
nothing more is required to qualify the firm for a license. It
was for this reason that in Heinfelt v. Art", 135 Ca1.App.
445 [27 P.2d 420], in construing the statute that formed the
basis of the present code provisions, the court held that to
1" It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the
capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a real
estate salesman within this State without first oLtaining a real estate
license from the division."
2" No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a
real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this State shall bring
or maintain any action in the courts of this State for the collcdion of
compensation for the performance of any of the acts mentioned in this
article without alIeging and proving that he was a duly licensed real
estate broker or real estate salesman at the time the alIeged cause of
action arose. "
8" 'Person' includes copartnership, corporation, company and firm."
4Blls. & Prof. Code, §§ 10150, 1015!!.
IiBu8. & Prof. Code, §10150.6.
eBus. & Prof. Code, § 10153.
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require a partnership liC'el1se in addition to individual licenses, whcn all the members of the partnership were licensed, "would accomplish nothing useful in carrying out
the purpose of the act and would, in fact, call for merely a
double licensc for persons whose qualifications have alrcady
been favorably passed upon." (135 Cal.App. at p. 449.) 7
The holding of the Heinlelt ease docs not render the provi.
sions of the Real Estate Law governing partnership licenses
superfluous. Those provisions were designed, not for firms in
which all of tlle members are licenscd brokers, but for firms
in which somc of the members will not act as brokers. Thus'i
the only regulation in the California Administrative Code·
that specifies a procedure for obtaining a partnership licellse
explieitly applies only to partnerships in which not all of the
members act as brokers. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 10, § 2743.)
Furthcrmore, section 10158 of the Real Estate Law assumes
that thc partnership licensed is one in which some of the
members will not act as brokers,s and this assumption also
underlies the difference in the scope of sections 10152 and
10153. The former empowers the Real Estate Commissioner
to require proof of the good character and reputation of
every member of the partnership, whereas the latter provides
for an examination to test the skill of only" [those partners]
through whom [the IJartnership] proposes to act" as a broker. Thus a partnership license is required so that the licensing authorities may inquire into the integrity of a firm, some
of whose members are not engaged in brokerage activities.
.
Our conclusion that the Real Estate Law does not prohibit
individually licensed brokers from acting in partnership
without a sl'parate license finds added support from a comparison of the licensing requirements of the Business and
Professions Code governing real estate brokers with those
governing contractors. The Legislature used phraseology in
sections 10130 and 10136 virtually identical with that used in
!;ections 7028 and 7031, which respectively forbid any unliI

7Defendants contend that section 2740 of title 10 of the California
Administrative Code, promUlgated after the Rein/elt decision, 80
changes the Rcal E~tatc Law that that case should not be followed.
Section 2i40, howcl'er, merely rephrased and consolidated sections 10158
and 10159 of the Business and Professions Code, which were considered
by the court in the rIcin/elt case.
8" When a real estate license is granted to a copartnership, if it
desires ally of its m~mbers other than the one or ones through whom it
is already licensed to act as a real estate broker, it shnll procure 8ll
additionalliceDse to 80 employ each of 8uch additional members."
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censed "person" (which undcr sl,etiou 7025 includes an individual, a firm, topartlll'rship, corporation, association, or
other organization, or any combination of any thereof) to
engage in the busiuess 01' to act in the capacity of a contractor, or to bring or maintain allY aetion for compensation based
on the transaction of suth business. These provisions were
apparently 110t designed to prevent individually licensed contractors from acting as a partnership, for the Legislature
expressly provided in section 7029 that individually licensed
contractors may not join forces without obtaining an additional joint license. If sections 7028 and 7031 are construed
as prohibiting such action then section 70~9 is rcdundant.
Since it appears that the Legislature did not regard sections
7028 and 7031 as prohibitillg individually licensed contractors fro111 acting jointly and since those sections correspond so
closely to sections 10130 and 10136, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislaturc would have adopted a section comparable to section 7029 had it meant to prohibit individually
licensed brokers from acting as a partnership. 'Ve hold that
plaintiff may maintain this action, and we therefore reach
the merits of his claim.
Defendants appointed plaintiff and his partner exclusive
agents to sell certain real property owned by defendants. The
partners found two purchasers, and a deposit receipt agreement embodying a contract of sale preparcd by plaintiff's
partner was signed by defendants and by the purchasers.
This agreement provided: "The total purchase price is
Eighty Seven Thousand ($87.000) Dollars. The balance is to
be paid within - - days from datc of acceptance hereof
by Seller as follows: Subject to Buyers assuming an existing
loan of approximately Fifty Eight 'rhousand ($58.000) Dollars secured by first D/T and bearing 6 (six %) per cent interest. . . . "
The principal of the existing loan was in fact approximately $54,000 and was evidenced by a note held by the
Bank of California, which provided, "In case any change is
made in the title to all or any part of the property described
in the deed of trust securing this note, the whole of said
principal shall forthwith become due and payable at the election of the holder of this note." The purchasers made a cash
down payment into escrow, but for reasons not specified in
the record, the transaction proceeded no further. Defendants
elected not to keep any of the purchasers' money, and plaintiff received no commission.
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The trial court found that the clause "Subject to Buyers
assuming an existing loan," was a condition made for the
defendants' benefit; that the purchasers never undertook to
aSSUllle the loan and were never ready, willing, and able to
assume it or to perform the other conditions in the deposit
receipt agreement; that defendants were at aU times prepared to convey title to the property upon performance of
the conditions; and that defendants were not estopped to
deny that the purchasers wcre ready, willing and able to
perform.
Plaintiff's claim depends on whether the purchasers he
produced were ready, willing, and financially able to perform. (E.g., JIleyer v. Scl[}{Jio, 80 Cal.App.2d 161, 164 [181
P.2d 690].) [3] 'Whcn a YCl1<lor entcrs a valid unconditional contract of salc with a purchaser procurcd by a broker.
the purclHlser's acceptability is cUlIclusi\,ply presumed because the ,'endor is est(lpped to dcny the qualifications of a
purchaser with whom he is willing- to contract. (Se(' Edwards
v. Billow, 31 Cal.~d 3;)0, 3:)9-3(jO [188 P.2d 748] and cases
cited; McNamara v. Sfec/';/Ilfl11, 20~ Cal. 56!), 572-573 [262 P.
297].) [4] 'When the coutl'act is cOlHlitiollal, howcver, the
broker's commission is not earned if the condition is not
performed. (Colton v. O'Brien, 217 Cal. 551, 553 [20 P.2d
43] ; Wiseman Y. Ross, ~o~ Cal..App.~d 138, 142 [20 Cal.Rptr.
565] ; see Britschui v. Jl cCall, 41 Cal.2d 138, 144-145 [257
P.2d 977].)
[5] Although tIle erucial clause in the contract, "Subject
to Buyers assuming an existing loan," is couched in the
language of condition, plailltiff, relying on asserted customary practice, eontt'I!c1s that the parties illtended the clause as
a promise by the purchasers to assume the existing loan concurrently with the execution of a deed by defendants. Defendants contend that the contract was contingent on thtl
purchasers' establishing their financial ability by arranging
with the Bank of California to assume the existing loan.
A rf'ading of the contract in conjunction with the note
evidencing the loan to be assumed supports defendants' interpretation. The note provided that if any change werH
made in the title to the property, the holder of the note could
forthwith declare the {'ntire principal amount of owr $50,000
due and payable. If th(' purchasers assumed this loan m('rely
by accepting a deed so providing, both parties would immediately subject thcmselves to liability for the entire principal of the loan. In view of this drastic consequence to both
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partit's and thc conditional language used by them, the trial
court could rcasonably conclude that they iutended to make
the liale contingcnt on the purchasers' obtaining the approval
of the hoWer of the note prior to any change in titlc to the
property. (See UniversaZ SaZes Co/·p. v. California Press Co.,
20 Ca1.2d 751, 772 [128 P.2cl 665] ; Estate of Rule, 25 Ca1.2d
1, 10-11 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319]; 3 Witkin, California Procedure, Appeal, § 89 (a).) Since the contract was
conditional, no presumption of the purchasers' qualifications
arises, and the finding of the trial court that they were not
ready, willing, and able to perform is conclusive.
The jUdgmcnt is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
7,1£164.
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